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Note to the Reader 
This case is both a research case and an issue-based case on the subject of leading change and 
implementing Lean Six Sigma (L6σ).  As a research case, it describes how the Commander, senior leaders, 
and frontline employees used L6σ to save Letterkenny Army Depot from closure.  The research segment of 
the case also pairs the depot Commander’s approach to leading change with published frameworks for 
leading change in business organizations. The research case is formatted in the columns.  
As an issue-based or decision case, the setting might be an administrative or service function in the military 
or a business organization.  The overarching issue in the case: can the lessons learned from Letterkenny 
Army depot – a manufacturing facility – be applied to leading change in an administrative/service 
organization.  The issue-based segment of the case is formatted in blue text boxes and raises issues in the 
context of the research case. 
The authors acknowledge the support of the Lean Aerospace Initiative at MIT and of Dr. George Roth, the 
principal research associate there for Enterprise Change studies, and Dr. John Gray, Letterkenny Army 
Depot Deputy Commander, in researching and preparing this case. 
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Lean Enterprise Change Research Case Study Series 
 
 
This case study provides an example of managerial and organizational 
changes that have accumulated into significant performance 
improvements.  It is one of a series of case studies undertaken by 
researchers at the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology.  LAI focuses on developing, testing and studying 
the application of lean and other management principles in the aerospace 
industry.  LAI’s sponsors, and their improvement initiatives, have created 
a natural laboratory for studying lean enterprise efforts.  The case studies 
in this series report on interesting and novel applications of lean 
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Letterkenny Army Depot: The Army Teaches Business a Lesson in Lean Six Sigma is a 
case study of Letterkenny Army Depot, one of five Army maintenance depots.  
Letterkenny recapitalizes missiles, HMMWV's, generators, and other equipment for the 
United States Army.  Recapitalizing equipment means completely disassembling the 
system, cleaning and/or replacing every component, subcomponent and part, and 
reassembling and testing the equipment.  
 
Col. William Guinn was assigned as depot commander in July 2002 only to find the 
depot was in deep financial and operational trouble.  Letterkenny had … 
• experienced an operating loss of $31 million on revenues of $120 million 
• work flows that were dysfunctional and inefficient 
• the highest hourly wage rates among all the depots 
• an infrastructure that was badly in need of repair 
Additionally, the depot faced possible closing by the Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) Commission in 2005.   
 
This case documents Col. Guinn’s Lean Six Sigma deployment at Letterkenny Army 
Depot from 2002 to 2005.  Using the principles and tools of Lean, Letterkenny’s 
commander, senior leaders, managers, and employees successfully transformed the depot 
from the Army’s worst to its best performing depot in terms of productivity and cost 
efficiency.  Three years after the depot’s Lean journey began, the 2005 BRAC 
Commission not only recommended keeping Letterkenny open, but also assigned it 
additional programs.  In the same year, Letterkenny won the public sector Shingo Prize 
for applying Lean to its Patriot Missile recapitalization program. 
      
     The authors use a framework developed by Michael George in his book Lean Six 
Sigma for Service to present the results of their research.  In addition to being a research 
case (i.e., a descriptive case), the case raises issues on deploying Lean Six Sigma – issues 
that can be addressed in business and military educational settings.  Letterkenny Army 
Depot: The Army Teaches Business a Lesson in Lean Six Sigma is case about Lean Six 






Dr. Roger K. Harvey     Chet Labedz 
Phone: 970.963.1444     Phone: 617.253.7633 
Email: rharvey_2@yahoo.com   Email: labedz@mit.edu  
Website: www.valueassociates.org
Letterkenny Army Depot Case Lean Six Sigma Case Page:  1 
 Letterkenny Army Depot: 




Colonel William Guinn assumed command of Letterkenny Army Depot on July 18, 
2002.   Upon his arrival, Col. Guinn’s deputy, Dr. John Gray, didn't hand him the usual 
Review & Assessment Report; there wasn't one – previous depot leaders hadn’t prepared 
one.  Even without a formal report, Col. Guinn knew things weren't well at Letterkenny, 
but in reflecting back on his first day at Letterkenny, "I didn't know how bad things really 
were until my escort casually informed me that he knew why I had been assigned to the 
depot – to shut it down, he told me.”  
It took Col. Guinn only a few days to identify the major issues facing the depot: 
• an operating loss of $31 million on revenues of $120 million, primarily due to 
accounting changes 
• work flows that were dysfunctional and inefficient 
• the highest hourly wage rates among all the depots 
• an infrastructure that was badly in need of repair 
Col. Guinn's opening comment at his first Directorate meeting: "I would be doing the 
Army and the American taxpayers a favor by closing this depot... I would be putting this 
place out of its misery... It would be a mercy killing and no one would court martial me 
for doing it."  
As if this statement wasn't frightening enough, everyone sitting around the table knew 
that Letterkenny would be facing another "mercy killing" in three years: the 2005 Base 
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission.1 Not much of a choice said one 
Director, "immediate death or a slow death over the next three years."  
Col. Guinn was keenly aware of the potential impact on Letterkenny of BRAC:  the 
loss of more than 1800 jobs -- jobs paying an average of $46,000, the highest in the area; 
the negative economic impact on Chambersburg and the county; and the expense to the 
Army of relocating the work being done at Letterkenny and of closing the depot. 
Letterkenny had already been BRAC’d in 1995, after which 1200 jobs were eliminated 
and 1,450 acres were turned over to the Letterkenny Industrial Development Authority 
for private development.  Rather than bite the economic bullet and make Letterkenny a 
more cost-efficient depot, Letterkenny and community leaders in 1995 took the political 
road to Washington to lobby to keep the depot whole and intact. The political strategy 
failed miserably -- the depot was chopped in half by the BRAC Commission.  
Col. Guinn knew that if Letterkenny could not economically compete with the Army's 
other depots and private contractors, it faced substantial downsizing in 2005, or even 
                                                 
1 BRAC is a Congressionally authorized process that the Department of Defense has used to reorganize its 
base structure.  BRAC recommendations frequently involve closing or substantially downsizing depots and 
other military facilities. 
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 worse, closure.  But contrary to popular belief, Col. Guinn hadn’t come to close 
Letterkenny.  He concluded his first Directorate meeting by stating, "I took this 
assignment to make Letterkenny the most cost-efficient depot in the Army; I have never 
retreated, I have never surrendered; I'm here to fight for the survival of Letterkenny.  And 
here is my plan to accomplish the mission..." 
 
NOW: 
Fast forward the clock three years to October 5, 2005, (ret) Col. Guinn, now former 
Commander of the Letterkenny Army Depot, is guest of honor at the Shingo Award 
ceremony.  Letterkenny was one of four winners of the Public Sector Shingo Prize.   
The Shingo Prize for Excellence in Manufacturing was established in 1988 to 
promote excellence in manufacturing. The achievements and recognition of the Prize was 
cited by Business Week as “the Nobel prize of manufacturing….”  In 2005, a new 
category for the Shingo Prize was defined:  a Public Sector Prize.  The Shingo Public 
Sector Prize was established to "recognize entities in the United States that have 
demonstrated outstanding achievements in manufacturing/MRO (Maintenance, Repair 
and Operations) and the supporting business processes leading to outstanding quality, 
cost, delivery, and business/financial results." 
Not only had Letterkenny won the Shingo Public Sector Prize, it had survived BRAC 
and more. The BRAC proposal called for a transfer of 150 - 200 jobs to Letterkenny from 
bases in Red River, Texas; Rock Island, Illinois; and Barstow, California. According to 
Dr. Gray, "We are eyeing construction of a new $1 million facility in the depot's 
ammunition area to house missile repair work slated to transfer to Letterkenny." 
The Chambersburg Public Opinion, the local newspaper, bannered the following 
headlines on February 15, 2006:  “Army Brass Lauds Depot Manufacturing.”  While 
attending Shingo Prize celebration ceremonies at Letterkenny Army Depot, Gen. James 
Pillsbury, Commander of Army Aviation and Missile Command, spoke to the men and 
women who worked on the PATRIOT missile system: 
 Let me tell you something, this is a big deal. This is a big deal. This is the 
first time a public sector Army depot has won a Shingo Award. You have 
taken the PATRIOT, the most complicated war system the Army has, and 
fixed it… A person’s importance can’t be judged by how close he or she is 
to the front line. You all are just as important to the strategic mission of 
the Army as anybody else. You do it better. You do it better every day. I 
couldn't be prouder to be part of the team.  
Can it get any better than the Shingo Prize?  Not for Letterkenny, but it did for Col. 
Guinn. Recognizing the contribution that Col. Guinn made in keeping Letterkenny alive 
and well in his district, U.S. Rep. Bill Shuster featured a photo of Col. Guinn and himself 
on the Congressman’s Christmas card.  Col. Guinn received recognition by the Shingo 
Prize Committee and Congressman Shuster for his contribution to the Army and the 
district. As one of Col. Guinn’s colleagues remarked, “the Shingo Prize – a great award; 
your photo on a Congressman’s Christmas card – priceless.” 
 




Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD), 
one of five Army maintenance depots, is 
a government-owned, government- 
operated installation located in south 
central Pennsylvania, near 
Chambersburg.  Letterkenny is known 
for its unique tactical missile repair 
capabilities including the complete 
refurbishing of PATRIOT missile 
system’s associated ground support and 
radar equipment.  
Most recently, Letterkenny expanded 
its service capabilities to overhauling 
tactical wheeled vehicles (HMMWV's), 
material handling equipment (7.5 Ton 
Cranes), generators, and Mobile Kitchen 
Trailers. Financially, Letterkenny's 
annual operating budget was $372 
million in 2005 with an annual payroll of 
$130 million and local procurement 
totaling $35 million.   
Among its many tasks, Letterkenny 
totally recapitalizes PATRIOT Missile 
Air Defense Systems.  Recapitalizing a 
system means completely disassembling 
the system, cleaning and/or replacing 
every component, subcomponent and 
part, and reassembling and testing the 
system.  When a system is “recapped,” it 
is considered as good as or better than 
new – zero miles and zero hours.  A 
PATRIOT battery consists of up to forty 
launchers, a radar unit, control station 
unit, information and coordination unit, 
communications relay unit, antenna mast 
unit, and power generating equipment.  
Letterkenny was tasked in 2002 with 
recapping all the PATRIOT Missile Air 
Defense units at a rate of one battalion 
per year until 2010.   
Letterkenny Industrial Complex 
 
18,864 Acres, 2.2 Million Labor Hours, Approx 1 Million Sq Ft of Shop Floor 
1313 Gov’t Employees, 711 Contract/Military, 699 Tenants & Contractors = 2,723 people 
The organizational structure of 
Letterkenny is similar to a medium size 
division of a multinational corporation.  
The Depot Commander is equivalent to a 
division CEO or general manager; his 
Deputy, a civilian, to a COO. The 
Deputy offers an Army depot continuity 
because Commanders are typically 
rotated in and out of a position every two 
years. Exhibit I shows Letterkenny’s 
organization chart.  The Directorate level 
is similar to the Vice President level in a 
corporate organization.   
One Directorate deserves special 
note because it is not what the name 
implies.  The Directorate of Maintenance 
is similar to the production function in a 
manufacturing company; it is not the 
directorate for building or land 
maintenance. All production-like 
functions at Letterkenny come under the 
Directorate of Maintenance because the 
depot’s mission is maintenance:  all the 
recapping and repair shops, production, 
production engineering and control – 
anyone who turns a wrench is under the 
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 Directorate of Maintenance.  There were 
700 people reporting to the Director of 
Maintenance in 2002.  Most of the L6σ 
events occurred within this Directorate. 
The Depot Commander reports to the 
Commander of the Army Aviation and 
Missile Command – one of eleven 
subordinate commands of the Army’s 
Army Material Command.   The Army 
Material Command directs the activities 
of depots, arsenals, ammunition plants, 
laboratories, test activities, and 
procurement operations.  In 2002, the 
Army Material Command had a budget 
of $20-plus Billion and employed over 
60,000 military, civilian, and contractor 
personnel, as well as managing 
inventory valued at over $7 Billion. In 
terms of size, it ranks with the top 10 
corporations in the country.  Letterkenny 
with an annual operating budget of $220 
million was a small part of the Army 
Material Command’s overall operations, 
but a critical one in terms of maintaining 




CHANGE OF COMMAND 
 
Col. William A. Guinn arrived at 
Letterkenny in July 2002, less than a 
year after 9-11 and the invasion of 
Afghanistan.  The nation was at war – 
there was no lack of work at Army 
depots.  So Letterkenny wasn’t facing a 
demand problem - their problem was 
low productivity and high cost. At Army 
Material Command headquarters, 
Letterkenny was placed at the very 
bottom of the list of depots and 
installations in terms of cost and 
productivity.  Gen. Paul Kern, Army 
Material Command Commander at the 
time, believed Letterkenny would be the 
first Army installation to be BRAC’d in 
2005.   Col. Guinn had been assigned to 
a losing battle. 
Col. Guinn joined the Army as an 
enlisted man, became commissioned and 
rose through the ranks on the 
operational-side of the Army.  He 
attended the Army’s command schools 
and colleges.  The closest Col. Guinn 
came to learning about managing costs 
and productivity in a manufacturing 
operation was a Master’s Degree in 
Industrial Relations from Iowa State 
University and a Masters of Science 
Degree from the Industrial College of 
the Armed Forces. His assignment to 
Letterkenny Army Depot was cranked-
out by the Army’s personnel system.  
Col. Guinn had a good record on the 
operational-side of the Army, experience 
commanding and leading soldiers, but no 
training or experience in turning around 
a manufacturing operation or leading a 
L6σ mission.  At the time, there was no 
Depot Commanders’ school for the 
management of Army depots or 
installations.  So who planted the seed of 
L6σ for the business side of the Army? 
Six months earlier Gen. Kern had 
embraced L6σ after a reserve lieutenant 
at Red River Army Depot implemented 
L6σ on a vehicle recap production line. 
The reservist told Gen. Kern that he 
learned L6σ by reading a book by James 
Womack.  Gen. Kern bought the book – 
James P. Womack’s and Daniel T. 
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 Jones’s book Lean Thinking2 – read it 
and became a “believer.” He retained the 
Simpler Corporation as a L6σ consultant 
to the Army, and offered their L6σ 
consulting services to the depots.  
According to Gen. Kern, “Letterkenny 
never got on board with L6σ.”  After 
approving Col. Guinn’s assignment to 
Letterkenny, Gen. Kern suggested to 
Col. Guinn “that he read Womack’s 
book and contact Simpler.”  
Col. Guinn followed orders. But 
what happened next were not orders; 
Col. Guinn discovered a new religion – 
L6σ. To say that he “just got religion” 
would be an understatement.  He would 
embrace the concepts and tools of L6σ 
as the foundation of his management 
philosophy and practice. In his view, 
L6σ could turn around Letterkenny.  He 
became convinced L6σ could save 
Letterkenny from being BRAC’d in 
2005.   
Even though Col. Guinn believed 
L6σ could turn around Letterkenny, his 
challenge was convincing 1,000 
employees – his Deputy, Directors, 
Chiefs, supervisors, union officers, and 
frontline employees – that L6σ would 
keep Letterkenny alive.  He knew he had 
the support of Gen. Kern.  But three 
years to BRAC… how was he going to 
implement L6σ and achieve the benefits 
of Lean before 2005?  In August, 2002 
Col. Guinn defined his vision:  “to go to 
BRAC in 2005 with the most efficient 
depot in the Army.”  Letterkenny would 
never again be at the bottom of the Army 
Material Command’s performance list.  
                                                 
2 James P. Womack & Daniel T. Jones, Lean 
Thinking: Banish Waste and Create Wealth in 
Your Corporation, Revised and updated, Free 
Press, 1996, 2003. 

















The Army personnel system assigned a new commander to Letterkenny without 
considering the depot’s requirements or the commander’s core competencies.  A 
commanding officer approved but did not select his new depot commander. How 
should the Army or a company match needs with capability? What capabilities are 
essential for successfully leading change in complex organizations? How do these 
questions and your answers change in a service organization? How does your 
organization address these issues?  What does the Army’s current system emphasize 
instead, and why? 
 
FRAMEWORK FOR DEPLOYING LEAN SIX SIGMA 
Michael George devotes Part II of his book Lean Six Sigma for Service to L6σ 
deployment.3 George derived his L6σ deployment phases from four successful business 
and government implementations of L6σ reported earlier in his book. This section of the 
case will match Michael George's "Phases for Deploying Lean Six Sigma" with Col. 
Guinn's approach to implementing L6σ at Letterkenny Army Depot.   
 
George proposes that a L6σ deployment occurs in four phases: 
 
1.  Readiness Assessment -- select a L6σ Champion, establish a baseline snapshot of 
the organization, interview top management, engage key influencers, and assess 
the impact of what you've discovered. 
 
2.  Engagement -- create a clear burning platform, reveal how people's lives will be 
different, and change management meeting agendas. 
 
3.  Mobilization -- commission an executive team, create the infrastructure, train, 
define first-wave projects, and define metrics. 
 
4. Performance and Control -- plan ahead for the benefits, change management 
structure, and avoid the pitfalls of L6σ deceleration. 
 
George’s four phase deployment framework will be overlaid below onto the history of 




                                                 
3 Michael L. George, Lean Six Sigma for Service, McGraw-Hill, 2003. pp 185 – 252. 
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 Phase I: READINESS ASSESSMENT 
This phase of Michael George’s 
deployment framework is not unlike 
approaching a railroad crossing – stop, 
look, listen – before crossing the tracks 
or in this case, before rolling the L6σ 
locomotive down the tracks.  A sitting 
CEO would first stop business as usual, 
but Col. Guinn hadn’t started yet so 
there was nothing to stop.    But he did 
look and listen.  He looked by walking 
the shop floor and listened by asking for 
reports and scheduling briefings.  This 
all happened within a month of the 
Commander’s arrival. 
The first report Col. Guinn directed 
was a Review and Analysis (R&A) 
report – a quarterly report prepared at 
Army depots and installations detailing 
the status and progress of Directorates 
(i.e., departments or functions in a 
business organization) toward 
organizational goals. The R&A report 
would have satisfied George’s 
recommendation of establishing a 
baseline snapshot of an organization. As 
it turned-out, recent quarterly R&A’s 
had not been prepared at Letterkenny; 
consequently, it was impossible for the 
new Commander to know how bad 
things really were.  Col. Guinn 
scheduled a meeting of Directors “to 
figure out what was going on.”  Col. 
Guinn remembers the briefing as “five 
hours of meaningless numbers.”  He 
received no answers to questions like 
“how long does it take to hire a new 
employee… how long does it take to 
process a change slip… how many 
actual hours to recap a launcher… what 
is the total repair cost for a missile sub-
assembly?”  He knew that he and 
everyone else in the room had to have 
answers to these types of questions 
before a process or activity could be 
improved or targeted for improvement.  
The Commander also knew it would be 
hard to define metrics for some 
processes in the depot, but it had to be 
done.  If you can’t measure it, you can’t 
control it. How can we be “quicker—
cheaper—better” if we don’t measure 
time, dollars and rejects?  
Letterkenny senior leaders and 
Directors were directed by the 
Commander to re-define performance 
measures for their areas. It took several 
months and many iterations to define the 
“right” metrics. Balanced Score Cards 
were as popular in the Army then as they 
are now, but Col. Guinn avoided them 
for the whole depot and for individual 
Directorates.  He believed Army Score 
Card standards were set far too low, 
leading to a sense of accomplishment 
when none existed.  The metrics his 
Directors were to use would be cardinal 
and trackable from period-to-period.  
Direction-of-change and rate-of-change 
were to be measured.  No scores for the 
Directors at Letterkenny—just hard 
numbers showing continuous 
improvement. The scoreboard for the 
new game in town had been defined.  
And following the guidelines of L6σ, the 
scores were going to be visible to all and 
be posted throughout the depot. 
Col. Guinn also announced that his 
focus was going to be Lean rather than 
Six Sigma.  In his opinion, a process has 
to be leaned before quality can be 
addressed or before sophisticated 
information systems can be applied.  
Letterkenny already had a Directorate of 
Product Assurance engaged in Six 
Sigma.  Better was not the problem at 
Letterkenny – the burning need was 
productivity improvement and cost 
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 reduction. So during the Readiness 
phase, it was the Lean in L6σ that was to 
be implemented, managed and 
measured. 
As it turned out, the Product 
Assurance area provided the 
Commander with more than just quality 
control.  While walking the shop floor, 
Col. Guinn asked an Industrial Engineer 
from the Production Engineering 
Division what he was doing on a 
HMMWV production line and what his 
background was.  Steve Miller 
introduced himself as a West Point 
graduate with a Masters Degree in 
Business Administration, serving 5 years 
in the military, and then 10 years in 
industry as a process and manufacturing 
engineer.  As a process engineer for a 
hot glass production automotive supply 
Original Equipment Manufacturer and 
later as a senior manufacturing engineer 
for a mobile hydraulic crane materials 
handling company, Miller had learned 
the Toyota Production System.  He came 
to Letterkenny shortly after the 1992 
BRAC to do process improvement work 
in anticipation of the next BRAC in 
1995.  He brought with him 8 years of 
experience in L6σ and an extensive 
library of books on the subject. Prior to 
2002, there was a different philosophy of 
process improvement.  Early on Miller 
was pulled-aside and told to slow down 
on efficiency improvements; he was told 
that his job was to focus on developing 
projects to spend money to expand 
capacity and capabilities, not to save 
money by cutting production labor hours 
on existing money making programs 
such as PATRIOT. He put his L6σ 
books in boxes; they stayed in boxes, 
even after Letterkenny was BRAC’d in 
1995, until Col. Guinn asked him to be 
his Lean Champion in autumn of 2002.  
The Commander had a Lean Champion. 
Michael George’s readiness 
assessment involves uncovering factors 
that will shape deployment plans: staff 
experiences with past change initiatives; 
understanding organizational strategy 
and priorities; how decisions are made 
and conflict resolved; what people 
consider key to their successes within an 
organization; and how work gets done 
(collaboration versus silos).  As shown 
in Exhibit II, the command staff 
prepared, published, and communicated 
a Strategic Business Plan that addressed 
topics such as philosophy (customer 
focus, management by measurement, 
improve all we do); vision (world class 
…); mission (sustain operating forces); 
and objectives (quality, improve 
operations, support Army 
transformation).  L6σ as the new 
management practice on the depot was 
also communicated in newsletters and 
through open meetings with Directors, 
who in turn cascaded the L6σ message 
to their Chiefs and to frontline 
employees.  Starting with this phase, and 
in every phase of George’s L6σ 
deployment cycle, Col. Guinn used all 
internal communications media available 
to him and even the local newspapers to 
inform all Letterkenny stakeholders 
about the depot’s deployment of L6σ. 
The groundwork was being laid to move 
from the Readiness phase to the 
Engagement phase.  (In later phases, 
Col. Guinn even more vigorously 
advertised the successes the depot was 
having with L6σ.) 
But was the emphasis on open 
communication and publicity necessary 
at this early phase of the deployment 
initiative?  
The answer was YES.  Not 
surprisingly, Col. Guinn’s L6σ initiative 
was greeted as “just another Army 
improvement program.”  As one 
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 Director put it, “We had quality circles, 
process engineering, value engineering, 
and on and on… we had heard it all 
before – this was just another flavor-of-
the-month improvement program in our 
minds.  We knew Guinn would be gone 
in two years, and someone else would 
come along with their improvement 
program.”  Even Col. Guinn’s deputy 
was skeptical at first: “You know, we 
don’t have to do this; Gen. Kern will be 
gone in a year or two, and all this L6σ 
stuff will be forgotten.”  Responding to a 
question of when she believed L6σ was 
going to be permanent fixture at 
Letterkenny, the Directorate of 
Maintenance replied: “When I saw Col. 
Guinn and his deputy actually participate 
in L6σ events, I knew it was for real 
when I realized they were walking the 
talk.  Before that, I thought it was all 
talk.” 
The other steps outlined by George 
for the Readiness Assessment Phase – 
understanding the organization’s 
decision style (collaborative or silo) and 
employees’ personal keys to success, 
and engaging key influencers – will find 
a better fit in George’s later phases of 
Letterkenny’s L6σ deployment. 
The Readiness Assessment Phase 
lasted only a month for Col. Guinn.  It 
didn’t take long to assess the efficiency 
of the production function at 
Letterkenny, the metrics of the score 
keeping system, or the attitude toward 
change.  Col. Guinn concluded that “the 
employees want to do a good job – 
people at Letterkenny didn’t come to 
work to do a lousy job… they wanted to 
be productive. The problem wasn’t the 
people; as Deming would say, it’s the 
system.”  His assessment completed, the 
battle for change was about to begin.  It 
was time for Engagement. 
 
 









Discussion Issues – The Case 
 
What more could the depot commander have done to assess the readiness of the 
depot for change?   
 
The commander was new to the depot.  How could he have identified key influencers 
in the organization and engaged them for the pending changes?  
 
How can Balanced Scorecard targets be calibrated to goals with both reach and 
realism?   
 
Discussion Issues – Your Organization 
 
What are the characteristics of an effective L6σ Champion? Discuss selecting a 
Champion candidate, one having in-depth training and experience in L6σ but little 
knowledge of your organization, versus a candidate from within your organization 
with no L6σ background.  
 
In the context of a pending L6σ deployment in your organization, what critical 
success factors would you include in a baseline snapshot of your organization?   
 
We all know the key influencers in our organization.  How would you go about 
bringing them on board the L6σ train?  How do these questions and your answers 
change for a service organization?  
 
Rapid improvement events L6σ LSS of often led leads to changed work practices for 
a union-represented workforce.  Letterkenny experienced no labor-management 
difficulties in changing work practices.  If your organization employs union-
represented labor, how would gain union acceptance of L6σ?  
  
Are Balanced Scorecards used in your organization?  If YES, what Balance 
Scorecard performance measures are currently used?  If NO, should they be used in 
your organization?  How would performance measures change before, during, and 
after a L6σ deployment?   
Phase II: ENGAGEMENT
Michael George subtitles this phase 
“creating pull.”  He introduces the 
Engagement phase with the statement: 
“One of the fundamental secrets of 
success is publicizing the link of Lean 
Six Sigma to business strategy.”  Among 
the many management practices the 
business side of the Army does well is to 
link mission, vision, objectives, strategy, 
and goals.  The Army takes the “link” a 
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 step deeper into the organization through 
a framework called the “Mission 
Essential Tasks List” or METL. 
METL is a framework designed to 
cascade objectives, strategy, and goals 
from the top of the Army down through 
all levels of personnel.  It is an active 
link between all the words and charts at 
top command levels and execution on 
the factory floor or in support offices.  
METL, in the format of a matrix, assigns 
primary and secondary accountability 
down to all levels of the organization 
and to those people responsible for 
carrying out locally defined initiatives – 
initiatives which in turn lead to 
accomplishing the organization’s overall 
objectives and goals.  
The Letterkenny initiatives, as 
identified by Col. Guinn and his senior 
staff, are shown in Exhibit II.  The 
Letterkenny METL matrix in Exhibit III 
linked the business side of the Army’s 
strategic objectives to Letterkenny’s 
supporting goals, and then assigned 
responsibilities for accomplishing those 
goals to each Directorate.  Performance 
measures were assigned to each 
Goal/Directorate intersection and 
tracked over time. Although Exhibit III 
is presented as a static exhibit, when 
performance measures are tracked over 
time, METL becomes a dynamic 
management tool as it color codes 
“progress toward goal accomplishment.”  
At weekly meetings of senior leaders 
and Directors, those Goal/Directorate 
intersections colored yellow or red 
received directed attention and, if 
necessary, additional resources.  
Col. Guinn, senior leaders, and 
Directors put in place the paper-side of 
successfully managing change.  But this 
wasn’t engagement as the Army would 
define it, nor is it the way Michael 
George defines engagement.  Not 
enough action!  The real action started in 
August 2002 as the “rules of 
engagement” were defined. 
George proposes three “rules of 
engagement” for deploying L6σ:  
1. identify a clear burning platform 
2. create a concrete picture of how 
people’s lives will be different 
3. change meeting agendas 
The “clear burning platform” had 
been set for Letterkenny by the 1995 
BRAC and the approaching 2005 
BRAC.  As stated in the Prologue, it was 
simply to get better at what they were 
doing, or die.  The engagement plan: to 
become the highest productivity and 
lowest cost depot, or die. 
Even with BRAC as a burning 
platform, Col. Guinn still had to 
convince an aging workforce (average 
age 51 ), one group ready for early 
retirement, and another group who, 
given the option of keeping their job or a 
severance check of $25,000, would take 
the check and leave.  As one employee 
remarked, “BRAC would have meant a 
new pickup truck for me.”   
How do you deal with “attitude” and 
employee resistance to change?  
Letterkenny’s senior leaders dealt with 
this issue during the Mobilization phase, 
as we will see in the next section. 
George’s next rule of engagement – 
creating a concrete picture of how 
people’s lives will change – was a matter 
of moving people out of their safe zones.  
As a soldier and a commander, Col. 
Guinn knew the question in everyone’s 
mind was “what’s in it for me?” What 
Col. Guinn did was rephrase the 
question in the minds of everyone from 
the top leadership to frontline 
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 employees.  Each of his rephrased 
questions came from different sources.  
His first question came directly from 
L6σ principles and practices: “What’s in 
it for the customer”? His second 
question came from the Army pathos: 
“What can we do that will make life 
better for the soldier”?   
Customers were invited to 
Letterkenny, sometimes to live near the 
depot for extended periods of time, in 
order to specify exactly what they 
wanted.  For example, members of the 
Army’s Special Forces team worked 
with Letterkenny engineers and shop 
people in re-designing standard 
HMMWV’s to meet their special 
requirements.  The customer was asked 
to specify the finished product, the 
quality, the delivery time … everything 
but the cost.  Then if the product came in 
under cost, and it frequently did because 
of L6σ, the customer received a refund 
check for the savings.  If an employee 
had to change a location or cross-train 
for a process to become more efficient, it 
was because it was good for the 
customer.  Throughout the Engagement 
phase and into the two remaining stages, 
the focus of change was “doing it better 
for the customer.” It was not protecting 
turf; if was not business as usual, it was 
not staying in one’s safe zone.  The 
Commander set the target – the customer 
– and everyone at Letterkenny was 
constantly reminded to keep the 
customer in their sights.  And, of course, 
the customer was the soldier. 
Col. Guinn also relied on the hard 
realities of war for redirecting focus 
away from “what’s in for me” concerns.   
People at Letterkenny were acutely 
aware of their importance to the war 
effort and their support of the soldier in 
the field.  There were pictures of trucks 
blown apart by roadside bombs with 
nothing left but the cab built and 
reinforced with armor by Letterkenny 
employees.  There were letters from 
soldiers whose lives were saved by work 
done at Letterkenny.  As one of the first-
line supervisors expressed it, one who 
strongly resisted Lean changes to his 
area, “what was I supposed to say to the 
Colonel when he took me aside and said 
that I was going to be the one to write 
the letter to a mother who lost her son 
because we had the HMMWV that could 
have saved his life still in my [deleted] 
shop … it wasn’t about me anymore.” 
George’s third rule of engagement is 
changing meeting agendas.  Directorate 
meetings were once a week.  All 
Directors and senior leaders attended the 
meetings.  Performance metrics for 
Directorates had already been changed.  
METL was used as a framework for 
progress toward goals and objects. 
Behind the color coded METL matrix 
was hard numbers and period-to-period 
percentage changes.  A color was yellow 
or red because Directorates were not 
meeting hard-number objectives.  As 
L6σ projects were implemented in the 
later deployment phases, results were 
reported in “cost – schedule – quality” 
metrics. Col. Guinn saw meetings that 
were based on L6σ metrics as a way of 
changing the culture at Letterkenny; as a 
way of embedding L6σ process 
improvement into the life blood of 
Letterkenny; and as a way of assuring 
that L6σ would survive after he left 
Letterkenny. Meetings wouldn’t change 
the culture of Letterkenny, but the 
content would.  Meeting agendas based 
on L6σ results were an important way of 
communicating what management 
priorities were at Letterkenny. 
The Engagement phase and the 
Mobilization phase overlapped at 
Letterkenny.  The phases were not 
Letterkenny Army Depot Case Lean Six Sigma Case Page:  13 
 sequential – they moved in parallel.  The 
period was August–September, 2002; 
less than three months after the change 
in command.  The change clock was 
ticking… the build-up for operation Iraqi 
Freedom had started… Col. Guinn had 
been in command for three months.  









“A business initiative like Lean Six Sigma can reach its full potential in terms of both 
business results and resource deployment only when it is fully integrated into the regular 
 
Discussion Issues – The Case 
 
The time-line for the Engagement phase was extremely short at Letterkenny.  
What steps were overlooked by the commander and senior leaders that could have 
removed obstacles to change… that could have removed reasons to resist L6σ… 
that could have dealt with the “what’s in it for me” factor (WIIFM)?    What 
factors should have determined the L6σ Engagement time-line at Letterkenny?  
How long should have been the commander’s Engagement time-line? 
 
Discussion Issues – Your Organization 
 
Prepare a time-line for the Engagement phase of L6σ in your organization.  
Annotate the time-line with activities and events.   
 
Vision – mission – goals – etc. statements are valuable at the top levels of a large 
organization.  What is their value in your organization, especially if you are far 
down the organization ladder?  If you believe your organization should draft such 
statements,  what should be their content?    
 
What is the clear burning platform for change in your organization?  Is the threat 
of a budget cut a “clear burning platform” for deploying L6σ?  Why shouldn’t L6σ 
be used as a workforce reduction plan; after all, it is called “Lean” Six Sigma?  
How do you sell L6σ to an organization with no chance for new business (e.g., a 
service organization or a market-restricted company)?  Should you? 
 
When you deploy L6σ in your organization, how will people’s lives change?  How 
do you handle the common situation where the lives of key influencers in your 
organization will change the most and often not for the better?  
 
Other than discussing L6σ metrics, how else should your meeting agendas change?  
Consider the list of attendees for your current leadership meetings.  How should 
the list change before and after deploying L6σ?  Prepare an outline of a typical 
post-deployment L6σ  meeting. 
 
In your organization, should you Lean first or Six Sigma first?  Given limited 
resources and the need for early successes, can you or should you do both 
simultaneously?  Can you – and should you – achieve Six Sigma quality control on 
an non-Leaned process? 
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 management structures and business flow of an organization.  If not, it will eventually 
become isolated into silos or programs-du jour that fade away.” 
 




Michael George proposed five goals 
for mobilizing an organization for L6σ 
deployment.  The actions taken at 
Letterkenny to implement L6σ will be 
presented in terms of George’s goals.  
 
Mobilization Goal #1: Commission an 
Executive Team to Oversee 
Deployment.  Col. Guinn’s first act of 
mobilization was to establish an Office 
of Business Transformation.  This top 
level office (see Exhibit I, Letterkenny 
Organization Chart) was assigned a dual 
mission: implement L6σ and develop 
new business.  The rationale for the 
office was that L6σ would free people, 
space, and overhead resources.  If Col. 
Guinn was going to stick to his 
announcement that L6σ wasn’t a 
workforce reduction plan, the freed-up 
capacity would have to be taken up with 
new business.  Mark Sheffield was 
named Director of the Transformation 
Office; his responsibility – find new 
business. 
The other new member of the 
Transformation Office was Steve Miller, 
L6σ Champion.  The organizational 
placement and staffing of the Business 
Transformation Office broadcasted the 
priority the Commander gave to L6σ. 
Although Miller formally reported to the 
Director of Transformation, in fact, Col. 
Guinn went directly to Miller and Miller 
directly to Col. Guinn on all matters of 
L6σ.  The direct line to the depot 
Commander became especially 
important when there was line-manager 
or supervisor resistance to a L6σ event 
or when coordination among 
Directorates was required to implement 
a major change.  Col. Guinn believed 
that he communicated his priority for 
L6σ by where he placed his Lean 
Champion in the organization, but more 
importantly, by the Champion’s 
reporting line.  As one Director reported, 
“We all knew if Steve Miller or Bart 
Bartling and Ron Bercaw [Simpler 
consultants] had a problem, they could 
go right to the Commander.” 
There were ten members on the Lean 
Core Team lead by Lean Champion 
Miller.  The majority of the members 
came from the Directorate of 
Maintenance – Methods and Standards 
Group, and for organizational purposes 
resided in that Directorate. Members 
were selected because they had dealt 
with shop-floor metrics, were 
quantitatively oriented, and could 
quickly learn L6σ tools.  Being on the 
Lean Core Team was a full-time job.  
Among their duties were developing and 
facilitating L6σ events across the depot 
and training Letterkenny employees in 
the principles and tools of L6σ. Usually 
3 or 4 members from the Lean Core 
Team were assigned to Value Stream 
Analysis and Rapid Improvement 
Teams.  
 
Mobilization Goal #2: Create the 
Infrastructure.  The groundwork for 
infrastructure began with the Business 
Transformation Office, the Lean 
Champion’s reporting line, and the full-
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 time Lean Core Team.  But as Michael 
George reports, a failure factor under 
this goal is creating another silo and 
staffing it with people who have no 
connections with the real work going on 
in the organization.  Lean teams are staff 
functions; the real work is being done by 
line managers and frontline employees.  
The challenge: line people are 
performing their jobs; they are working 
to meet production goals; and then the 
Lean team arrives to conduct a L6σ 
event – production slows or grinds to a 
halt; production people are pulled to help 
conduct the event; and, questions of 
priority are raised by supervisors.  A 
classic clash between line and staff 
functions.   
How did Letterkenny establish an 
infrastructure that resulted in 
collaboration between their Lean teams 
and the line organization? 
The potential conflict was indirectly 
addressed by command group actions 
already discussed in the Engagement 
phase: line organization buy-in of 
mission, vision, objectives, strategy, and 
goals; the Mission Essential Tasks List 
(METL) matrix used for Directorate 
meetings; a shared burning platform; re-
definition of performance goal metrics; 
and meeting agendas built on L6σ 
issues.  Infrastructure, however, is more 
about the organization structure and 
interactions among people with different 
responsibilities and priorities.  Two 
factors at Letterkenny broke down the 
silos and the conflict between line and 
staff: membership on L6σ event teams 
and Col. Guinn’s management style. 
The majority of L6σ events at 
Letterkenny were of two types: Value 
Stream Analyses (VSAs) and Rapid 
Improvement Events (RIEs).  There 
were typically ten members on an event 
team, with three or four members from 
the Lean Core Team.  Three members 
were from the process being leaned (the 
sponsor) and three members were from 
other depot line or staff functions.  A 
member of an event team might be the 
Director or middle manager whose area 
was being leaned.  He or she would 
agree on their area’s team members, who 
always included a union person, plus 
team members from outside the 
sponsor’s area.  As part of the VSA, 
future improvement projects would be 
identified.  Then one or several possible 
improvement projects would be framed 
as RIEs.  RIE team selection followed 
the same process as that for VSAs; 
however, RIE teams had one additional 
team member.  Each team had assigned 
to it a so-called “barrier buster” – an 
individual in authority who could break 
down resistance to changes proposed by 
the RIE team.  If the resistance really 
became strong or cut across multiple 
Directorate lines, then the ultimate 
barrier buster was the Commander 
himself.  
An RIE at Letterkenny was a 
collaborative effort conducted over a 
four week period.  The integrated team 
might even meet before the RIE’s 
official four week start time (pre-RIE 
meetings) to determine what supplies 
and equipment would be needed for the 
event.  On the opening day of the four 
week RIE period, Col. Guinn presented a 
motivational, goal oriented speech on 
“their” lean event. During the first three 
weeks of an event, the team worked 
together observing existing activities 
within a process, measuring current 
throughput, conducting time and motion- 
type studies, and planning changes on 
paper or cutouts.  During this three week 
period, the RIE Team was a part-time 
assignment for team members; it became 
Letterkenny Army Depot Case Lean Six Sigma Case Page:  17 
 a full-time job during the fourth week. 
The dollar cost of each team member’s 
hours, as well supply and equipment 
costs, were assigned to the cost of the 
event.  (These costs would later be 
matched against savings to calculate a 
net savings resulting from the event.)  
Three or four concurrent RIEs might be 
running over the same four week period.  
RIE leadership positions and 
briefings were assigned to frontline 
personnel.  Lean Core Team members 
and Directors on the RIE did not lead 
events or brief outcomes — they were 
member participants; frontline people 
who knew the existing process and 
afterward would sustain process changes 
were designated team leaders and 
briefers.  Each week the RIE teams 
briefed their progress to the Commander, 
sponsors, other senior leaders, and 
Directors and/or their Deputies.  
Attendance was required for those 
directly in charge of a leaned area.  
Anyone else in the depot was welcome 
to attend any RIE briefing, which 
followed Col. Guinn’s open 
communication – open door policy.  If 
decisions had to be made, the leaders 
were in the room that could make the 
decision.  
The first three weeks were 
preparation for the “fun” week – week 
four was implementation week and a 
full-time job for team members.  Starting 
on Monday of week four and through 
Thursday morning, the RIE team was 
actually making the changes: painting 
and striping floors, placing tool shadow 
boxes, moving in new racks, and setting 
new equipment.  Thursday afternoon the 
team did a site brief on the new changes; 
Friday morning was a final conference 
room out-briefing, after which token 
awards (e.g., Lean hats) were presented.  
Again, any senior leader, Director, 
middle manager, or union officer was 
invited to attend the final briefing.  Col. 
Guinn attended both the site and 
conference room briefings.  RIE 
briefings were high priority meetings for 
Col. Guinn and the depot’s command 
group.  In order to attend one RIE 
briefing, Col. Guinn missed a 
headquarters meeting held by the 
commanding General of Letterkenny’s 
command group.  “Had I missed one of 
the briefings, it would have 
communicated to the team and everyone 
else at depot that I didn’t think what they 
were doing was important.  It also 
communicated to my commanding 
General our priorities at Letterkenny.” 
The second factor that broke down 
silos at Letterkenny was the Commander 
himself.  Col. Guinn lead L6σ at 
Letterkenny by conviction and, as one of 
his Director’s said, “tough love.”  He 
was passionate about L6σ and what it 
could do to turn Letterkenny into a cost 
efficient depot.  According to several 
frontline workers, Col. Guinn managed 
by talking to people up-and-down the 
line, by attending briefings and asking 
hard questions, and by walking the shop 
floors asking questions.  He was there, 
and when he was there, he talked L6σ.  
But Col. Guinn was also a Commander 
in a military sense.  One Director 
described it as “the Colonel’s way or the 
highway.”  One supervisor who admitted 
that he and “the Colonel knocked heads 
more than once over RIEs in his area,” 
said that his resistance ended when he 
took me for a walk and showed me the 
highway.”  According to Letterkenny’s 
L6σ Champion Miller, “Col. Guinn 
knew right… he could look at a process, 
an activity, a cell and know it wasn’t 
right… and he wouldn’t settle for 
anything less than right.”   When another 
Director was asked how stove silos were 
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 broken down at Letterkenny, he replied 
“simple – a strong Commander 
overcomes stove-pipes.” 
And so it was at Letterkenny, 
infrastructure started on paper with 
vision-strategy-goals, and ended with the 
actions of a strong leader.  In between 
were collaborative teams, meetings, 
events, and briefings.  L6σ responsibility 
and accountability was constantly and 
consistently pushed to the frontline 
employees – to workers who knew the 
activities and processes – while the 
leadership never lost sight of the goals, 
quicker–cheaper–better, and the ultimate 
goal: meeting the needs of the customer.  
Within a year, the majority of Lean 
project suggestions came from the 
“floor” and not from supervisors or 
senior leadership.  The groundwork was 
laid for imbedding L6σ in the culture of 
Letterkenny.  As one senior leader 
remarked, “even if our next Commander 
came here with no knowledge of L6σ, he 
couldn’t have stopped the L6σ ball from 
rolling – it’s now our life here at 
Letterkenny.”  (Postscript: Col. Guinn’s 
successor, Col. Robert Swenson, had no 
desire to stop L6σ and in fact has totally 
embraced L6σ for the depot.) 
 
Mobilization Goal #3: Develop 
Training.  Under this goal, Michael 
George presents guidelines for 
executive, process owner, and L6σ team 
member education and simulation 
programs.  Under infrastructure and 
training goals, he also discusses 
capabilities necessary for green belts, 
black belts, master black belts, and 
champions. Formal training is a critical 
element of his L6σ deployment phases. 
Formal training was not the case at 
Letterkenny.  The constraint on formal 
training was time and budget.  
Commanders were normally assigned to 
depots and installations for two years.  
The next BRAC was three years away.  
Col. Guinn decided that he didn’t have a 
year or even six months for formal 
training classes for his employees.  Col. 
Guinn decided to combine training with 
participation in Lean events. His was the 
practical solution to the training goal: 
learn by doing.  He set a goal that every 
employee participates in at least one 
Lean event, which would result in 
awareness, buy-in, and basic training in 
L6σ.  As part of the personnel system at 
Letterkenny, everyone from senior 
leaders to the men and women on the 
shop floor (and especially, the men and 
women on the shop floor) were tracked 
for their participation in L6σ events. In 
many cases, people were assigned to 
L6σ projects because it was their turn to 
participate.   
What did it mean to “learn by doing” 
at Letterkenny?  As Dr. Gray said, “We 
learned L6σ by going to the University 
of Dirty Hands.  We teamed up with 
first-line and second-line supervisors, 
with the people on the shop floor, and 
with the secretaries in the offices to form 
Lean Teams.  Then we conducted L6σ 
events together… that’s how we learned 
L6σ at Letterkenny. And I’ll tell you 
something else; along with the basics of 
L6σ, we all learned to appreciate the 
other persons’ jobs and they better 
appreciated our jobs.”   
Letterkenny’s University of Dirty 
Hands initially relied heavily on 
instructors from the Simpler Group.  The 
instructors were the so-called Senseis 
who had been assigned to Letterkenny 
by the Simpler Group.  Throughout Col. 
Guinn’s command at Letterkenny, a 
Simpler consultant was stationed at the 
depot for a minimum of one week per 
month, and as needed, several weeks per 
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 month.  Simpler consultants conducted 
training classes in L6σ, coached Value 
Stream Analyses and Rapid 
Improvement Events, and initially were 
the go-to people for dealing with L6σ 
issues at Letterkenny.  Lean Champion 
Steve Miller and Simpler kicked off L6σ 
at Letterkenny; as the “participation” 
philosophy cascaded through time and 
the organization, others contributed to 
the L6σ education function.  As time 
passed, Letterkenny built-up a core of 
resident experts – black and green belts 
without official certificates other than 
those awarded by the University of Dirty 
Hands. 
Another element in the curriculum at 
the University of Dirty Hands was field 
trips. Col. Guinn had a staff member 
draw a circle with a one-hundred mile 
radius on a map around Letterkenny and 
then identify any business engaged in 
L6σ within that circle.  These companies 
(two JLG plants, K-Mart distribution, 
Target distribution Harley Davidson, 
Mack/Volvo Truck, United Defense, 
Gabler Trucking and Logistics) were 
only a bus ride and a day away.  Key 
influencers were invited to go on L6σ 
fieldtrips: senior leaders, Directors, 
Chiefs, first and second line supervisors, 
union leaders, and frontline employees.  
Who would turn down a day off work, a 
bus ride through the hills of 
Pennsylvania, and a free lunch?  It was 
an event – the employees called it an 
“off-site.”  But “off-sites” turned out to 
be a lot more than pleasure rides.  People 
saw how things could be done; they saw 
that work areas didn’t have to be 
cluttered and disorganized; they saw 
flow and customer pull firsthand, they 
asked how can we do this or that in our 
department?  The visits were discussed 
and debriefed on the bus ride back to 
Letterkenny. More discussions occurred 
at meetings and on the shop floors once 
people were back at work. The early off-
sites showed possibilities; they led to 
buy-in; they led to innovation; they lead 
to excitement.  After one off-site visit, 
one of the Directors remarked, “I 
became convinced that there was 
something to this thing called Lean Six 
Sigma and that it just might work at 
Letterkenny.”  As early as one year later, 
the off-sites had a totally different 
impact:  “we’re doing it better than they 
are… they could be doing this or that 
and have less WIP [Work-in-Process].” 
As the paint shop supervisor remembers 
his trip, “I saw for the first time that for 
a paint shop to be productive it didn’t 
have to be dirty with piles of stuff all 
over the place waiting to be painted.  
Now if you look at my shop, it’s so clean 
it doesn’t look like anything is 
happening.  We pull from our customers 
so we don’t have work-in-process.  You 
can eat off the floor in the paint shop, 
which is exactly what Col. Guinn said he 
wanted to do when we finished all our 
RIEs.” 
 The early off-sites were educational 
and motivational; the later trips were 
reinforcing and rewarding.  During Col. 
Guinn’s three year command at 
Letterkenny, there were over 250 formal 
4-week RIEs with 750 participants.  
Letterkenny’s leaders realized that the 4-
week formal RIEs were not always 
necessary, so teams conducted hundreds 
of “mini-Kaizen” events after the first 
year of L6σ deployment. Building the 
L6σ knowledge base at Letterkenny took 
longer than it would have with formal 
training classes and a trained staff of 
black and green belts, but the “learning-
by-doing” philosophy resulted in an 
almost across the board buy-in and 
culture change for L6σ.  Almost across 
the board buy-in, but not total buy-in. 
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 It took only a year for frontline 
employees to realize two facts of L6σ:  
first, they knew their processes better 
than anyone else in the organization, 
even better than their first and second 
line supervisors; second, they had been 
empowered to suggest changes and 
make changes.  They were part of an 
improvement process “process”… they 
knew what improvement was all about 
(quicker—cheaper—better for the 
benefit of the customer); they could 
initiate change proposals; and they 
experienced the satisfaction that comes 
with doing it right.  (When James 
Womack toured Letterkenny in 2004, he 
left the guided tour, walked into an area, 
and told two shop employees that their 
area was one of the best examples of 
Lean that he had seen at the depot.  
Surprisingly, it was an area that they had 
leaned themselves – the RIE for their 
area was yet to be scheduled.  They had 
participated in RIEs in other areas and 
initiated the changes in their area on 
their own.)   
The push back at Letterkenny on 
L6σ was not the frontline employees or 
the union; rather, when there was 
resistance to change, it came from 
middle managers.  Previously there had 
been little emphasis on cost reduction – 
schedule acceleration – raising quality 
standards.  As standards based on L6σ 
were put in place, middle managers 
questioned their ability to meet or 
exceed those standards. Now they were 
managing by and being evaluated by 
metrics. Further, first and second line 
supervisors were used to employees 
coming to them to solve problems.  Now 
employees were solving their own 
problems.  Lean had been implemented 
at Letterkenny: customer pull, milk runs 
to pick-up work, flow, delivery to the 
next customer on the line. Frontline 
employees punched-in, went to their 
work areas, didn’t wait around for work 
because the flow had already started – 
the flow of work now set the schedule 
(TAKT time) and not the workers or 
supervisors.   
L6σ seemed to threaten supervisors’ 
traditional roles on the factory floor. It 
became especially important to include 
supervisors on L6σ teams and help them 
understand their new roles and 
measurement standards in a L6σ 
environment.  Open communication, 
Lean Core Team and consultant training, 
and involvement were the keys to 
overcoming middle management 
resistance at Letterkenny.  Frontline 
employees, unions, and senior leaders 
bought into L6σ during the first year; it 
took a second and third year for middle 
management buy-in and for managers to 
define new roles for themselves in a L6σ 
culture.  After a year or two of L6σ, 
middle managers knew “right” and 
experienced exceeding standards, so 
their confidence and acceptance of L6σ 
matched that of the rest of the 
organization. 
 
Mobilization Goal #5: Select and 
Charter First Wave Projects.  Initial 
project selection at Letterkenny was 
decided upon by Col. Guinn and his 
deputy Dr. Gray, but not without some 
disagreement.  Dr. Gray suggested 
several small VSAs and RIEs to “test 
run L6σ.  If L6σ events failed or got in 
the way of production, the negative 
impact would be minor.”  Col. Guinn 
took the opposite position: “If L6σ was 
going to have an impact on cost and 
efficiency, it needed to have a big 
impact.”  So the first project was the 
PATRIOT missile system, starting with 
the PATRIOT launcher. Of 
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 Letterkenny’s $121 million in revenues 
at the time, the PATRIOT recap program 
represented $101 million.  The 
Commander was looking down the road 
to the 2005 BRAC; he knew that cost 
and efficiency improvements had to be 
dramatic and the PATRIOT could 
produce dramatic cost reductions at the 
depot.  Of course, L6σ could fail, but 
because Letterkenny was at the bottom 
of the depot list in terms of cost and 
efficiency, there was no place to go but 
up. 
There were advantages to starting 
with the PATRIOT launcher.  The 
customer had defined the performance 
requirement – recap 40 launcher systems 
per year until the year 2010.  This meant 
a stable workload for the next eight 
years.  The event teams could also start 
with the launcher and then branch out to 
the other system components: radar 
units, control station units, information 
and coordination units, communications 
relay units, antenna mast units, and 
power generating equipment.  As shown 
in Table I, from October 2002 until 
2005, 95 Lean events were performed on 
the total PATRIOT missile system, 58 


















#  of 
RIEs 
#  of 
3-Ps 
Launcher 2 39 3 
AMG 1 13 0 
Radar 2 23 1 
ECS/ICC/CRG 1 2 0 
Administrative 
(Non-MRO) 
0 8 0 
Total 6 85 4 
 
Key:  ICC – Information & Coordination 
 Central vehicle 
ECS – Engagement Control Station 
CRG – Communications Relay Group 
AMG – Antenna Mast Group 
Source: Letterkenny Army Depot Shingo 
Prize Achievement Report, 2005. 
 
After the first VSA and follow-up 
RIEs, project selection was prioritized 
by TAKT time and bottlenecks in the 
work flow supporting the PATRIOT 
launcher.  As noted earlier, after the first 
year most of proposals for RIEs came 
from frontline employees.  The Lean 
Core Team decided what VSAs and 
RIEs were conducted, but the RIE 
proposals came from the shop floor. 
As with any business transformation, 
early successes are critical to overall 
success.  Col. Guinn’s philosophy was 
“nothing breeds success like success.”   
The positive results of every RIE were 
celebrated with rewards and depot-wide 
publicity.  There were multiple award 
programs based on L6σ participation and 
successes: a Lean Tenure Incentive 
Program, Commander’s Awards, and 
Lean Champion of the Year Awards.  
All awards and their recipients were 
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 given depot-wide and community-wide 
publicity through internal newsletters 
and press releases. A most important 
award, and the one that kept everyone 
focused on the bottom-line, was the Net 
Operating Result (NOR) Award.   
Col. Guinn had an agreement 
between management and the union that 
if the depot’s Net Operating Result 
(NOR = Total Revenues minus Total 
Expenses) exceeded a pre-budgeted 
level, each civilian employee at the 
depot received an end-of-year bonus. 
Under Col. Guinn, the bonus increased 
in increments of $200 as the pre-
budgeted NOR level was exceeded in 
increments of a million dollars.  In 2002, 
before L6σ was implemented, each 
employee at Letterkenny received a 
bonus of $131.  After L6σ, between the 
years 2003 and 2005, the maximum 
bonus allowed by the plan was paid to 
every civilian employee at Letterkenny 
— $1000. Commenting on the 
importance of the NOR award to his 
employees, the Directorate of 
Maintenance said “yeah, the money is 
important but not as important as seeing 
four more launchers or 18 more 
HMMWV’s going to the soldiers … 
that’s a feeling not even a $1000 can 
buy.”   
The sixth and final goal presented by 
Michael George poses the more 
important questions: how do you define 
success?  How were Lean events defined 
as successful at Letterkenny? 
 
Mobilization Goal #6: Reach 
Consensus on Common Metrics.  The 
Commander established the nature of the 
metrics after his first briefing from the 
senior leaders and Directors: cost—
schedule—quality, measured using hard 
numbers. With an eye for early 
successes, success first came in the form 
of soft savings, quickly followed by hard 
savings.  On the subject of soft savings, 
Dr. Gray said you could see benefits 
early and everywhere: “material wasn’t 
being moved 9 miles and work-in-
process disappeared.” The supervisor of 
the paint shop reported his area was 
processing 6 to 8 thousand parts a month 
prior to an RIE in his department; 
afterward the department was processing 
20 thousand parts with fewer people, and 
was operating at only 70% of capacity. 
(Exhibit IV reproduces the press release 
on Leaning the paint shop, known as the 
“Black Hole,” prior to being Leaned.) 
According to the Director of Supply and 
Transportation, “the warehouse 
receiving area was backlogged 20 to 30 
days before material was put away, plus 
lots of overtime, prior to our RIEs.  After 
our RIEs the backlog was 4 days with no 
overtime.” 
A change that resulted from many 
RIEs at Letterkenny, and one consistent 
with the tenets of L6σ, was installing 
new visual measures of departmental 
performance.  Production boards and 
quality boards were carefully designed 
to show output, times, defects and, of 
course, targets.  The boards were kept 
current so anyone at anytime could walk 
up to a department or area and see the 
hourly, daily, and weekly status of 
production.  Letterkenny gave new 
meaning to the old adage “if you don’t 
measure it, you won’t control it;” their 
twist seemed to be “if you don’t visually 
see it measured, you won’t try to 
improve it.”  Continuous improvement 
was as important as control at 
Letterkenny, especially because the 
workflow, not the employees, controlled 
the output.  What the employees 
controlled was the continuous 
improvement of the production process.   
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 The dominant metrics at Letterkenny 
were classified into Value Stream 
Performance measures, Customer 
Satisfaction and Quality measures, and 
On-time Delivery measures.  In the final 
analysis, metrics at Letterkenny were 
designed to measure either customer 
satisfaction or dollar savings.  Between 
L6σ and the efforts of the Product 
Assurance Directorate, customer 
satisfaction quickly became a non-issue.  
Initially the senior leaders at 
Letterkenny discovered that they were 
using faulty measures of quality.  Col. 
Guinn instructed the Director of Quality 
Assurance to develop quality measures 
similar to those used by J.D. Power and 
Associates (targeted customer phone 
calls, written surveys, and site hand-off 
visits).  He also instituted joint quality 
acceptance inspections with the depot’s 
largest customers, in which the 
customer’s quality people and the 
depot’s Directorate of Quality Assurance 
work together on the shop floor to set 
and enforce quality standards.  The goal: 
quality levels equaling or exceeding 
those set by Toyota. 
 As a result of the new quality 
standards and programs, the out-the-door 
defect rate fell to zero and customer 
satisfaction surveys rose to 100% 
satisfied ratings.  That left the on-going 
goals of increasing productivity and 
driving costs out of production and 
administrative processes.  Letterkenny’s 
results will be reported in the next 
section on Performance and Control. 
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Discussion Issues – The Case 
 
The commander at Letterkenny established a Business Transformation Office, which 
included the Lean Champion.  The Lean Champion formally reported to the Director 
of the Business Transformation Office rather than to the depot commander.  What 
would have been the advantages, if any, of establishing a L6σ Office comprised of 
Lean Core Team members, headed by the Lean Champion, with a direct reporting 
line to the commander?  
 
The commander deployed L6σ first to the biggest revenue generator on the depot.  
Discuss the advantages of starting small, especially when employees have minimal 
formalized training, learning from first-timer mistakes, and rolling out L6σ to major 
areas of the depot after a year or two.   Discuss the same question not in terms of the 
size of the project, but in terms of the number of Value Stream Analyses and Rapid 
Improvement Events, i.e., one or two a month versus 58 during the first year, as was 
true at Letterkenny. 
 
 
Discussion Issues – Your Organization 
 
What are the key performance measures in your organization?  Who defines those 
measures and from whose perspective?  How should target levels and target 
performance changes be set?  What is the difference between baseline targets and 
benchmarked targets?   
 
What are the qualifications for an effective Lean Champion? What should be the 
requirements for full-time L6σ Core Team members?  What actions should be taken 
to prevent your L6σ Core Team from being another silo in your organization? 
 
Letterkenny used an outside consultant to train managers and frontline workers in the 
principles and tools of L6σ.  Is this a viable alternative to formal training courses and 
certification in your organization?  Why or why not? 
 
During the case interviewing process, several Letterkenny employees said that four 
weeks was too long for an RIE.  In the context of your organization, what should be 
the time line of a typical RIE?  Define a specific event and draft a schedule of what 
should be done during each week (day) of the event timeline. 
 
Premise: Outside consulting organizations and even outside Black Belts are often 
project oriented.  They come into an organization, define a set of L6σ projects, 
implement those projects, first time savings are realized, and then they leave.  How 
does this approach to L6σ deployment imbed a continuous improvement practice and 
culture into an organization?  Compare this approach with Letterkenny’s practice of 
repeated L6σ events pushed down to frontline employees. 
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Phase IV: PERFORMANCE & CONTROL
Michael George’s final phase of L6σ 
deployment deals with post-L6σ changes 
in the organization: doing the same 
amount of work in less time; drifting 
away from priorities; inadequate 
tracking of results; achieving 
transformational change; and pitfalls and 
warning signs of L6σ deceleration.  
Many of George’s pitfalls and warnings 
as applied to Letterkenny were covered 
in previous phases, so this section will 
focus on Performance and results rather 
than Control. 
At Letterkenny, Value Stream 
Performance metrics measured 
productivity in terms of direct labor 
hours to produce output (e.g., direct 
labor hours to paint a launcher sub-
assembly), personnel redeployment (e.g., 
number of people reassigned after the 
paint shop RIE), and factory floor space 
(e.g., number of square feet saved after a 
pull system was put in place and work-
in-process was reduced to near zero).  
Factory floor space saved as a result of 
Lean events was measured in square 
feet. The space savings were significant: 
1.2 acres or 20% of the PATRIOT 
interior real estate was freed-up and used 
to house the new business being 
generated by the Business 
Transformation Office.  Although dollar 
savings from reduced floor space needs 
were not precisely measured, Col. Guinn 
believed the depot avoided over $20 
million in what would have been new 
construction costs for new products and 
services.  The space savings were 
especially important because there was 
no Military Construction money to fit up 
the new business. 
Dollar saving from direct labor hour 
reductions and personnel redeployment 
were diligently tracked by a specially 
designed cost tracking system, and then 
audited by the Directorate of Resource 
Management.  The dollar savings were 
calculated NET of the cost of the L6σ 
event itself.  Before a process or activity 
was selected for a RIE, an assessment 
was made of potential dollar savings.  If 
the process or activity was selected for 
an event, the dollar cost of the process or 
activity was carefully measured before 
the event to establish a baseline, usually 
by a time and motion study.  Prior to and 
during the event, the dollar cost of 
employees' time, supplies, new 
equipment – all costs for an event and 
for improvements – were recorded.  
After the event, the NET dollar savings 
due to the event (i.e., the baseline (prior) 
cost minus the cost of the event itself 
and new equipment minus the new cost 
of the process or activity) were 
calculated and extended over a 
reasonable time period.  If Net Dollar 
Return was less than zero, the event was 
considered a failure.  The measure of a 
successful event was a positive Net 
Dollar Return.  As explained below, 
60% of the audited savings were given 
back to the customer in the form of a 
“check” or as additional services at no 
charge, a practice unprecedented in the 
Army until Letterkenny’s L6σ 
initiatives.  40% was retained by the 
depot and allocated to capital 
improvement projects. 
But Letterkenny didn’t end the 
benefits of L6σ with a customer check or 
free services: the Directorate of 
Resource Management revised 
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 downward the required hours for future 
products and services based on the 
newly Leaned process.  For example, if 
pre-Lean Letterkenny contracted for 
10,000 direct labor hours to recap a 
launcher and post-Lean it took only 
9,000 hours, then in the future they 
would contract for 9,000 hours to 
perform the recap work.  As mentioned 
earlier, the cost savings calculated from 
the 1,000 direct labor hour reduction was 
passed back to the customer.  As 
Letterkenny’s Lean Champion said, “It 
was like shooting ourselves in the foot –
we kept raising the bar.”  In a business 
context, Letterkenny was continually 
lowering their price and ultimately their 
revenue for producing the same product.  
Also, they now had fewer hours over 
which to allocate overhead expenses.  In 
future years, they would have to find 
more savings or generate new business 
to earn the same Net Operating Results 
(NOR).  And they did.  Letterkenny’s 
gross revenues grew from $123.3 million 
in 2002 to $456 million in 2006.  New 
business came in the form of recapping 
generators, building mobile kitchens and 
trailers, and modifying HMMWVs for 
the Army’s Special Forces.  “During the 
up tempo of war, there is no shortage of 
business.”  
Were there diminishing returns after 
the first and second L6σ event in an 
area?  Surprisingly, the opposite was 
true: savings were greater with the 
second and third RIE in an area.  And 
there was also more to be Leaned – 
processes that hadn’t been Leaned 
before.  First-pass RIEs often focused 
more on the 6 S’s of Lean; Sort, 
Straighten, Scrub, Safety, Standardize 
and Sustain.  First pass events often had 
more of a “Clean” than a “Lean” 
approach.  Second-pass would focus on 
lowering labor hours, eliminating “fat”.  
Then the focus would shift to methods, 
removing excess steps, reducing wait 
times, improving processes.  
Chart I shows the direct labor hour 
reduction for the PATRIOT missile 



















Manhours per Unit Produced
ICC 10353 8343 8343 8894
ECS 10353 8567 8468 8693
CRG 6908 5403 5403 5865
AMG 5257 4706 3885 3942
Launcher 5096 4429 4393 4452
Radar 27204 27193 25642 26612
FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06
 
 
Key:  ICC – Information & Coordination Central vehicle 
ECS – Engagement Control Station 
CRG – Communications Relay Group 
AMG – Antenna Mast Group 
 





Supporting the productivity 
improvements shown in Chart I were 
significant reductions in shop floor 
travel distances for sub-assemblies, 
components, and parts processing.  L6σ 
events during the 2002–2005 period 
reduced travel distances by 1,155 miles, 
representing a 47% savings in distance 
traveled.  Turn around time to recap a 
PATRIOT launcher (i.e., in and out the 
door) fell by 2½ months.  But what were 
the final dollar savings from productivity 
increases? 
The program budget for PATRIOT 
recap fell from $127.7 million in fiscal 
2003 to $101.6 million in 2005. The 
number of PATRIOT systems recapped 
remained unchanged over the period at 
40 per year.  The bottom line savings for 
the PATRIOT recap program were $26.1 
million on an annual basis for 2003, 
2004 and 2005.  This bottom line impact 
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 triggered customer checks and depot 
employee bonuses.  Most importantly, 
the customer – the Army Aviation and 
Missile Command – benefited from 
cheaper in the current year by receiving 
dollar savings checks and in future years 
by reduced cost per PATRIOT system 
recapped.  The ultimate customers – the 
Soldiers – received their equipment 







Voice of the Customer
 
The first principle of L6σ is “listen 
to the voice of the customer." What adds 
value for the customer?  What adds no 
value for the customer and, therefore, is 
waste?  How are the benefits of 
productivity improvement passed on to 
the customer?  In the competitive 
business world, productivity 
improvements are passed on to the 
customer in the form of lower prices.  
But a depot operates in the world of 
costs, not prices.  So how was 
Letterkenny going to pass productivity 
improvements back to its customers?  
The answer – through two mechanisms: 
lowering future costs for the same work 
and issuing customer checks.  One offers 
a long-term benefit, the other an 
immediate one.  Both extend L6σ 
beyond listening to the voice of the 
customer to actually putting the savings 
into the customer’s pocket-book or 
doing additional work for the customer 
at no charge. 
 
Discussion Issues – The Case 
 
What other L6σ performance measures should have been tracked at Letterkenny?  
How should they have been visually displayed in work areas or publicized 
throughout the depot? 
 
 
Discussion Issues – Your Organization 
 
Recognizing that performance measures have two dimensions:  level and change over 
time, what are measures of “quicker–cheaper–better” in your organization?  How 
would you visually display these measures in work areas?   
 
In an administrative/service organization, how do you translate “quicker–cheaper– 
better” into measurable numbers? 
 
What reward systems for productivity improvements would you establish for 
customers?  For employees? 
 
Letterkenny Army Depot Case Lean Six Sigma Case Page:  29 
 As discussed earlier, after L6σ 
events and the resulting labor hour 
savings, the total number of hours 
applied to future products and services 
was reduced to reflect actual direct labor 
hours.  In an equation of budgeted-cost 
equaling unit cost times quantity, hourly 
labor cost was what it was – the actual 
hourly labor cost at Letterkenny – but 
the number of hours (quantity) was 
lowered year after year to reflect 
productivity improvements. The revenue 
to Letterkenny (unit labor cost times 
labor hours) per launcher was less year 
after year, but the cost to the Aviation 
and Missile Command, the Army, and 
the taxpayer also was less.  The problem 
from Col. Guinn’s point-of-view was 
that it could take up to two years for 
central command to reflect 
Letterkenny’s productivity 
improvements with lower budgeted 
hours for a product or service.  The 
Commander’s challenge: immediately 
giving back to the customer the saving 
from L6σ.  He didn’t want to wait two 
years to show a customer the benefits 
from L6σ; he wanted to show them 
benefits in the current year.  He needed 
immediate recognition, because of the 
burning platform of BRAC 2005 that 
confronted Letterkenny. 
Col. Guinn presented the idea of a 
customer check to the Commander of the 
Army Material Command, Gen. Kern.  
Gen. Kern liked the idea but even with a 
General’s endorsement, Col. Guinn had 
to overcome several obstacles.  First, 
giving budgeted money back to the 
customer had never been done in the 
Army.  In fact, defining a higher 
command as a customer was novel. 
Second, returning budgeted monies 
violated the Army’s working capital 
fund regulations.  So Col. Guinn and the 
senior leadership went to work to invent 
a mechanism to give money back to the 
customer. Their mechanism avoided 
violating the law bypassing the Army 
working capital fund and directly giving 
the customer an accounting credit.4 The 
first “check” in the amount of $1.2 
million was presented to the Army 
Aviation and Missile Command's Lower 
Tier Project Office-PATRIOT in 
September 2003.  The Command 
“endorsed” the check back to 
Letterkenny, and then added another 
$300K of Command monies to fund the 
recap of four additional Launchers.  
Prior to Leaning the PATRIOT system, 
there were only sufficient funds 
available to recap 36 missile systems, so 
now a complete Battalion of 40 missile 
systems could be recapped. 
In keeping with the Commander’s 
philosophy of marketing L6σ successes 
to the depot and local community, 
ceremonial checks the size of a surf 
board were presented to the customer, 
photographed, and  reported in the 
depot’s newsletters and bulletin boards, 
local newspapers and television, and in 
numerous Army publications.  Most of 
the checks were “endorsed” and returned 
to Letterkenny for additional products 
and services at no charge.  As of the end 
of 2005, $4.7 million in customer checks 
had been issued to customers.  In fact, 
Dr. Gray reported that he now receives 
calls from customers asking when they 
can expect their checks.  A change in 
culture at Letterkenny and a change in 
customer expectations have been another 
benefit of L6σ.  
 
                                                 
4 The mechanism for returning budget dollars to 
a customer will be the subject of a future case by 
the authors. 
 





Michael George presents his L6σ 
deployment framework without a 
timeline.  For Letterkenny, deploying 
L6σ did not linearly follow George’s 
framework.  Letterkenny passed through 
the Readiness Assessment phase within a 
month or two of Col. Guinn’s arrival in 
July 2002, and then quickly moved to 
the Engagement and Mobilization 
phases.  These two phases were well 
underway by October 2002. The 
sequence of actions taken by Col. Guinn 
and Letterkenny senior leadership during 
Engagement and Mobilization did not 
follow the script suggested by George.  
Col. Guinn’s sense of urgency meant 
little time for formal training and 
certification. Also many of the elements 
of George’s fourth phase – Performance 
and Control – were put in place in 
earlier phases.  For example, the 
Business Transformation Office was 
established and charged with finding 
new business even before the first L6σ 
event. Organization structure and 
reporting line changes were put in place 
during the Engagement phase – changes 
that laid the groundwork for a true 
business transformation at Letterkenny.  
The first L6σ event was conducted in 
September 2002 and then followed by 58 
more events during next one-year period.  
The first customer check was presented 
in September 2003, just one year after 
that first event. 
  By the fall of 2003, one year after 
L6σ deployment, Letterkenny had 
passed through all of George’s first three 
phases, and then it remained in the 
fourth phase.  L6σ became the 
management philosophy and practice at 
Letterkenny.  It was extended to other 
 
Discussion Issues – The Case 
 
The Army Aviation and Missile Command was both a supplier (PATRIOT missile 
systems to be recapped, components, parts) and a customer.  What interdependencies 
and conflicts exist when a supplier and customer are the same entity? 
 
 
Discussion Issues – Your Organization 
 
Who are the customers in your organization?  How do you go about finding their 
needs, wants, and priorities?  How do you define your immediate customer’s needs in 
terms of their customers’ needs?  Should you – and do you – factor in the needs of 
other stakeholders who are not customers? 
 
How could you share your L6σ savings immediately with your customers?  How 
could you share savings in the long-run?  Even a more interesting question:  why 
would you want to share savings, especially if it meant reducing future funds 
budgeted to your area or organization? 
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 recap programs, products, and services.  
It was taken from the factory floor to the 
administrative and office areas. It 
became part of the culture and a source 
of great pride at Letterkenny. It 
happened quickly, probably more 
quickly than it would have happened in 
most business enterprises, except those 
facing imminent bankruptcy.  The 
Army’s timeline for command changes, 
the war, and the 2005 BRAC forced a 
short timeline on L6σ deployment at 
Letterkenny. 
In the spring of 2005, L6σ was used 
to set up and later Lean a HMMWV 
recap production line.  A production line 
was completely new at Letterkenny 
because the physical product moved 
down a line, which wasn’t true of the 
PATRIOT missile system components or 
the depot’s other products. In the 
PATRIOT recap process, when parts 
weren’t available, recap continued with 
other components or subassemblies.  If 
parts are unavailable in a production line 
setting, the line stops and workers had to 
move to other tasks, find non-revenue 
generating work, or in a worst case, 
stand idle. Letterkenny’s production line 
couldn’t stop; therefore, the parts flow 
and business partnerships were critical 
success factors to the success of 
Letterkenny’s HMMWV recap process. 
Why did the L6σ business 
transformation happen at Letterkenny 
and happen so quickly? The answer was 
summarized by Letterkenny’s Lean 
Champion: “the Commander, senior 
leaders, union leaders, supervisors, and 
employees … everyone was committed 
to being better, to improvement, and to 
doing it right.”   
 
 






Colonel Robert Swenson assumed command of Letterkenny Army Depot on August 
30, 2005.  Col. Guinn turned over command to Col. Swenson with a whole set of new 
challenges. With the arrival of a new Secretary of the Army, new pressures will be 
exerted on Army facilities such as the Letterkenny Army Depot.  There also will be 
another BRAC commission in the future and once again the threat of downsizing or 
closing Letterkenny.    To support the Army's force transformation model, Secretary 
Francis J. Harvey stood-up a comprehensive, Army-wide Business Transformation Office 
with a mission to Lean the Army’s business processes. When the Iraqi war winds down, 
supplemental war-time budgets will also wind down.  There is also the possibility that the 
Army's base budget will be reduced as Congress re-allocates monies to domestic 
programs or to paying down the national debt. And once again, those depots and other 
Army facilities that are least efficient may stand to lose the most dollars or go out of 
existence. A post- Iraq funding drawdown may not be BRAC, but it will be BRAC'ish in 
nature.   
 
 
Discussion Issues – The Case 
 
Many factors led to the success of L6σ at Letterkenny.  What were the three most 
critical success factors? 
 
Knowing what you know about “leading change in organizations,” critically evaluate 
Col. Guinn’s change leadership and change management.   
 
 
Discussion Issues – Your Organization 
 
Would the same three critical success factors that you identified for Letterkenny 
apply to your organization?  If a factor is difference, explain WHY. 
 
How does change leadership differ from change management? 
 
How does true business transformation differ from simple change? 
 
Should business transformation be top-down or bottom-up?  Enterprise-wide or 
component specific?  If business transformation is top-down and enterprise-wide, at 
what point should it transform to front-line workers and transition to a bottom-up 
strategy?  Why should – or should not – that transition occur? 
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 Col. Swenson and all other army leaders have been charged by Secretary Harvey to 
make their operations more “lean."  His goal is to free resources that can be better used to 
support the war-fighting side of the Army and to reduce taxpayer dollars supporting the 
military.  Col. Swenson and other Army leaders are challenged to achieve dollar savings 
goals being set for them by the Army leadership.  Saving dollars, managing within lower 
budgets, and promoting L6σ business practices are a new set of goals for all levels of the 
Army command structure.   
 
The lessons learned from Letterkenny Army Depot can help all levels of Army 
military and civilian leadership deal with the new priorities of the Army. And, because 
the business side of the Army is not unlike any large corporation challenged with 
"leaning" its manufacturing and administrative processes, the lessons from Letterkenny 
Army Depot apply as well to business organizations.  The lessons of the desire to survive, 
of business turnaround, of strong leadership, of motivating employees, and of deploying 
L6σ are the lessons that Letterkenny Army Depot taught business. 
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Sustain the operating forces by providing quality Air Defense and Tactical Missile 
Systems, Chemical and Biological Detection Systems, and associated equipment to 
Department of Defense customers and Foreign Allies. 
 
VISION 
World-class provider of logistical support capabilities for defense weapon systems and 
associated system/Soldier support equipment. 
 
STRATEGIC QUALITY OBJECTIVES  
The following Quality Objectives have been developed to provide the fundamental 
framework for ongoing business growth, success, and development and 
implementation of all initiatives.  The Mission Essential Task List (METL) 
methodology is used to cascade objectives down through the organization. 
 
SUPPORT ARMY TRANSFORMATION 
Our support to Army Transformation is imperative.  Relevance, readiness, and 
responsiveness are critical to the success of the Army as a whole.  We will focus  
future growth initiatives on the sole and partnered support we can provide to existing 
and new/emerging Army Weapon Systems, Soldier Support Equipment and we will 
seek to support other Joint services that can benefit from our abilities.  We will pursue 
process technology to recapitalize the depot.  Additionally, with our employees being 
the greatest asset, we will expand workforce knowledge base and abilities through 
education, developmental job assignments, and technical skill growth. 
 
SUSTAIN AND IMPROVE CURRENT DEPOT OPERATIONS 
Satisfying our customers by meeting or exceeding our mission quality, cost, and 
schedule requirements are the foundation for completing our designated core and non-
core workload.  We are committed and press forward in our journey on continually 
improving the depot through the application of ISO 9000 quality principles.  Our aim 
throughout the depot is to continually improve operations by reducing and eliminating 
non-value-added activities and functions, ensure relevant/pertinent tasks, and 
streamline processes to enhance effectiveness, efficiency and ensure affordability. 
 
SPECIFIC COMMANDER GOALS 
Specific Quality Objectives (Commander’s Goals) are actions we must take to 
enhance our business growth and ensure satisfaction of current and future customers. 
Source: Letterkenny Army Depot Shingo Prize Achievement Report, 2005. 
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 EXHIBIT III: Mission Essential Task List (METL) 
 
 

































































































z    Develop Partnership Initiatives   NA    NA    NA 
z    Recapitalize Depot         NA  NA 
z    Train Workforce            
 z   Quality           NA 
 z   Cost           NA 
 z   Delivery   NA    NA    NA 
  z  Increase Workload to 2.0M DLH    NA   NA     
  z  Support Successful Production Start-up of All New Workload            
  z  Clean up Depot           NA 
  z  100% Lean Participation by 30 July 05            
GREEN BLOCK INDICATES ACCEPTABLE PERFORMANCE TO OBJECTIVE  
YELLOW BLOCK INDICATES OBJECTIVE REQUIRES IMPROVEMENT  
RED BLOCK INDICATES UNACCEPTABLE PERFORMANCE TO OBJECTIVE  
Key:  
DOM = Directorate of Maintenance 
DRM = Directorate of Resource Management 
DOIM = Directorate of Information Management 
DPA = Directorate of Product Assurance 
DOC = Directorate of Contracting 
DRSK = Directorate of Risk Management 
DS&T = Directorate of Supply and Transportation 
CPAC = Civilian Personnel Advisory Center 
DPW = Directorate of Public Works 
 
Source: Letterkenny Army Depot Shingo Prize Achievement Report, 2005. 
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Department of Defense Best of Show 
Letterkenny Army Depot Eliminates Clean-Paint Bottleneck Using Lean Six 
Sigma 
 
In late 2002 at the start of Lean Six Sigma (L6σ) Continuous Improvement Program (CIP) activities 
on the PATRIOT Air Defense Missile System, it quickly became evident that the biggest constraints 
or bottlenecks affecting Lean implementation were the commonly shared Directorate of 
Maintenance Clean, Blast, Brush Plating, Paint Strip, Metal Treatment, Paint Preparation and Paint 
support operations located in Bldg 370 - otherwise known as the “BLACK HOLE.”  These 
operations are a critical value-added aspect for PATRIOT as well as all other value streams to 
provide corrosion abatement and life-cycle extension of refurbished components.  Prior to starting 
L6σ activities, about 8,000 parts per month were processed with supervisors typically having to 
continually expedite critical “got to have today” items.  “BLACK HOLE” supervision desperately 
asked for additional manpower to accomplish missions - this was not an option.   Depot Leadership 
decided to take a new approach by applying the Toyota Production System L6σ tools just being 
learned and applied with a good success on the PATRIOT Launcher system. 
 
To focus intently on this bottleneck, a separate Value Stream Analysis was conducted during which 
it was recognized that L6σ activities limited to one particular value stream, such as just PATRIOT, 
would not enable desired results for PATRIOT or any other program.  Ten Rapid Improvement 
(kaizen) Events and one Production Process Preparation (3-P) event were conducted starting in 
January 2003 and continued over the next 18 months.  Although definitive savings were difficult to 
document at the time of the individual events, by the latter half of 2004 it had become evident that 
the series of events had provided some of the biggest paybacks by the general performance 
improvement for all programs with parts processed through the bottleneck.  The processes were 
streamlined, wasteful operations were eliminated and a “Milk-Run” pull system was started.  The 
"Milk-Run" pull system picks up and drops off from each of the 13 cost centers from around the 
Depot each day, allowing for a steady flow of parts that are pulled into the areas rather than being 
pushed as previously done. 
 
The following specific improvements have been noted:  flow time has decreased from weeks to just 
days, travel distance decreased by 92% in Paint Prep and 32% in Silk Screening, 1,566 sq ft of floor 
space has been freed up for other missions.  Throughput and productivity significantly increased so 
that, during 2004 with the Operation Iraqi Freedom mission surge, parts volume raised to about 
20,000 parts per month without having to add personnel.  During 2005 three additional workers 
were hired as the parts volume rose to a high of 36,912 parts in March 2005, factoring in the added 
manpower productivity increased by 312%!  Process quality has also improved to the point in 
March 2005 when zero rejects were recorded and, during the six month period of November 2003 
through April 2005, only nine external rejects were recorded equating to a 99.993% quality rating.  
Bottom line:  With a Team-of-Teams approach, proper application of L6σ, a lot of good hard work 
and supportive leadership, the “BLACK HOLE” bottleneck has been effectively eliminated! 
 
Link to the following web site to view a video about this CIP effort: Best in Show Video 
<http://www.lead.army.mil/LEAN/LEAN_Clean_Plating_Production.wmv>
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